Iran-US Nuclear Deal and Its Prospects Under Joe Biden’s Administration
A twelve-year diplomatic process culminated on 14 July 2015 in Vienna with the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by the E3+3 (EU-3, China, Russia, and the United States), the P5+ 1 (P5 members of the United Nations), and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The agreement aims to to put an end to Iran’s secret and unidentified nuclear operations, which were first uncovered in 2003. The E3+3 and P5+1 accords require Iran to stop enriching uranium and plutonium and to enable International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear experts to assess nuclear installations. This ensures that Iran’s nuclear program is pursued for non-military and non-violent purposes.
The E3+3 and P5+1 agreement maintains the arms embargo in order to prevent the proliferation of offensive weapons and the transfer of ballistic missiles to Iran. Proponents of the agreement believed it would minimize the chance of conflict between Iran and its regional adversaries, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, by preventing Iran’s nuclear weapons research from resuming. In exchange for the release of billions of dollars in sanctions, Iran agreed to give up much of its nuclear program and permitted more intrusive foreign inspections. Furthermore, it took steps to assure that all work done in the Fordow, Natanz, and Arak facilities was solely for civilian reasons, including industrial and medical research. Sanctions on Iran’s oil industry produced years of economic stagnation, currency depreciation, and inflation prior to the JCPOA. Following the lifting of sanctions, inflation fell, exchange rates steadied, and exports—especially of oil, agricultural products, and luxury goods—soared as Iran re-established commercial contacts, particularly with the EU. Following the implementation of the JCPOA, Iran began exporting more than 2.1 million barrels per day.
When Donald Trump backed out of the pact in 2018, betraying his predecessor Barack Obama’s signature foreign policy, the fundamental source of Iran’s national income was hammered hard once more. The motivations driving the parties, particularly the US and Iran, to reach this agreement were anchored in regional conditions, with the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan playing a significant influence. Iran was designated a “Axis of Evil,” and it was surrounded by US ground soldiers. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been costly experiences for the United States. As a result, an exhausted Washington was left to handle Iran’s nuclear program.
Following the Trump administration, Biden underlined during his campaign that the resuscitation of the Iran nuclear deal sparked prospects for a reinvigorated US Middle East policy. According to Biden, the agreement would constrain Iran to the point where producing a nuclear bomb would take a year. Furthermore, IAEA inspectors who were happy with Tehran’s compliance paid frequent visits to Iran’s nuclear power plants. Although Biden’s new government was not fully convinced to return to the pact before entering office. However, the Iranian nuclear issue was seriously considered. While giving an interview to the New York Times, Biden said that;
“The best way to get some stability in the region is to deal with Iran as our priority”. In his article, Biden wrote, “make an unshakeable commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.” Biden’s nominee for national security adviser Jack Sullivan: “We are in a dangerous situation because the United States has left, Iran has moved closer to a nuclear weapon,” he told the Wall Street Journal. Biden went on to say, “After consulting with our allies and partners, we will engage in negotiations and subsequent agreements to tighten and extend Iran’s nuclear restrictions as well as address the missile program.”
The Biden administration has long contended that discussion, rather than the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy, is the best way to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon. According to Robert Malley (US Special Representative for Iran), following the Trump administration’s departure from the deal, Iran demonstrated hostile adverse behaviour and is on the verge of obtaining fissile material for bombs. After exiting the agreement in 2018, the US will lift hundreds of restrictions placed by the Trump administration. Iran would also revert its nuclear program to the original nuclear deal’s constraints, including limits on enrichment and the amount of material it could stockpile.
Furthermore, under the Biden administration, Robert Malley had signalled the state’s willingness to continue the agreement. He highlighted that diplomacy is the most effective option for this because military activities will not provide positive results. The original agreement, which limited Iran’s ability to produce and store the enriched uranium required for a nuclear weapon, was negotiated by the US in April 2021 through three European parties — the United Kingdom, Germany, and France — in exchange for the withdrawal of US “nuclear” sanctions against him. The administration warned in February 2022 that Iran’s nuclear development would make it difficult to return to the 2015 JCPOA or the Barack Obama-era deal unless a deal was reached “within the next few weeks,” but analysis shows that the deal was not the solution to Iran’s nuclear program; even if the deal had been implemented, Iran might very well proceed its nuclear program despite being the signatory of JCPOA. Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran would have eventually been permitted to produce highly enriched uranium and conduct other operations necessary for the development of a nuclear weapon. Even former President Obama stated that Iran may use “advanced centrifuges that enrich uranium relatively quickly” if the JCPOA timeframe expires.
When the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA, there were concerns about Iran’s strategic aims and compliance with the agreement, as well as the pact’s obvious faults, such as its incapacity to confront Iran’s ballistic-missile development. When the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA, there were concerns about Iran’s strategic aims and compliance with the agreement, as well as the pact’s numerous shortcomings, such as its inability to confront Iran’s ballistic-missile development. It delayed the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program. In exchange, it handed Tehran with a pre-packaged package of financial benefits, which have since been used to fuel domestic oppression and regional terror.
The writer is currently studying at National Defense University (NDU), Islamabad.