The war of 1965 between the countries of India and Pakistan is still shrouded in a bit of mystery and intrigue with both sides claiming that they have emerged from the conflict victorious. But what are the clear facts and how much of what we believe of the conflict is a result of wishful thinking and falsehoods? Are we really the clear victors or was there something more complicated at play behind the scenes? These are the questions that need to be addressed and to be brought to attention to the general populace.
This war, like the previous one before it that ended in 1949, originated from the countries’ disagreement over the proper accession of the land of Jammu & Kashmir. The conflict came into play once the Pakistan armed forces crossed over the line of control into Indian lands and tried to take over Indian occupied territory by force.
“Conflict resumed again in early 1965, when Pakistani and Indian forces clashed over disputed territory along the border between the two nations. Hostilities intensified that August when the Pakistani army attempted to take Kashmir by force. The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful, and the second India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate. This time, the international politics of the Cold War affected the nature of the conflict.” (U.S Department of State, 2009).
The insurgency operation was termed “Operation Gibraltar” and was centered around capturing India’s territory, especially influential positions like Amritsar that would aid in putting Pakistan in a more dominating position. This was brought forth by the idea that because India had lost the war against China recently in the year 1962 and of Pakistan’s recent victory in the Rann of Kuch, that they were weak and at a vulnerable position and Field Marshall Ayub Khan and the rest of the establishment decided to take advantage of this and infiltrated enemy territory. (DAWN, September 21st, 2009).
The Gibraltar force consisted of around 5,000 armed officers, among whom were present a few civilian personnel as well that the army included from the areas of Kashmir that they were trying to capture. At first, the operation was carried out successfully with various successful ambushes and pincers, however soon enough the Indian retribution against the Muslims also began. This retaliation led the locals that were aiding the Pakistani troops to suspend their help, and in some cases help the Indian forces instead. This ultimately led to the collapse of the Gibraltar Force and India had ended up taking hold of most of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir down to Muzzafarabad. (DAWN, September 21st 2009).
The next stage of the operation was Grand Slam, in which the order of the Pakistan high command was for the troops to engage the Indian forces in Aknur and destroy the line of communication serving the Indian army on the south side. (DAWN, September 21, 2009). This operation was doomed to failure as the Pakistan chain of command underwent a change in the midst of battle, leaving ample time for the Indian forces to withdraw and recover. (DAWN, September 9th 2015).
“The entire operation was planned on the miscalculation that Indian forces would not launch an attack across the international border. Except for a small coterie of top generals, very few in the armed forces knew about Operation Gibraltar. The foreign ministry under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that was a critical part of the entire operational plan had assured Ayub Khan that India could not afford to expand the war” (DAWN, September 9th, 2015).
The entirety of the operation was based on a false sense of security within the Pakistan high command’s ideas regarding what actions India might take as a result of the insurgency that they had planned. Field Marshall Ayub Khan, until the very moment that India launched its Sialkot and Lahore front attacks, was unaware of the fact that Operation Gibraltar had failed and that Indian forces were in control of Muzaffarabad and were inching towards the heart of the country. The reason why we were able to save face and succeed in repelling the Indian forces from the Lahore and Sialkot fronts, as well as the naval front, was not because of the Pakistan high command but despite it. The troops, despite sustaining heavy casualties and damage through uneducated decisions and operations that shouldn’t even have been carried out in the first place, were able to succeed in carrying out their orders.
“So it was for 99 per cent of the Pakistani armed forces, professional fighting men who obeyed orders, often paying the ultimate price, while the one per cent issued orders from their safe bunkers and palaces, far from the discordant sound of guns, planes and the rattle of tanks. These knights in shining armour gave their lives so that their leaders, wearing suits of rusted mail, could cover themselves in glory.” (DAWN, September 6th 2015).
The above is an excerpt from an article written by Retd. Air Commodore R. Sajad Akhtar, who explains that the only reason why the 1965 operation and conflict wasn’t a horrible and shameful defeat for us is precisely because of the troops that fulfilled their duties and through the blunders of the high command on India’s side In the end, the conflict was resolved through the involvement of the UN Security Council which passed a ceasefire order that General Chaudhary, the then COAS, advised Field Marshall Ayub Khan to accept lest Pakistan be forced into an uncomfortable position.
“If the war had continued for another week, Pakistan would have been forced to surrender. (Jeswant Singh, India at Risk — Mistakes, Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy).
Although this may be true, the Indian administration continues to throw shade and hide the reality of the situation. Of the Pakistan army holding at bay an opponent more than 3 times its size with much greater resources at its beck and call. To accept that they were still pressured into a stalemate is imperative. Regardless, we must understand that mistakes were made on our part as well and to learn from these instead of rejoicing over a victory that might not have actually been such at all. At least not the kind of victory that is portrayed.
The writer is currently studying at International Islamic University (IIUI), Islamabad.
